

NSWFB RETIREES FIRE NEWS
INCIDENT REPORTS



**2ND ALARM ST MARYS GARAGE COMPLEX
FIRE**



***“If I have Seen Further than Others...
It is by Standing on the Shoulders of Giants”***



Cover Picture: Firefighters call for water on prior to commencing fire attack. An initial line is in operation at the mid-point of the garage complex where firefighters have successfully cut off the rapidly spreading fire.

Incident Video



(Control + Click on YouTube symbols to watch)

Incident Summary:

Late in the afternoon of Wednesday 8th May 2024, neighbours observed thick black smoke venting from a garage structure within a residential unit complex at 91-95 Saddington Street, St Marys. The freestanding structure consisted of 17 garages and was located on the eastern side of the driveway concourse opposite the three-level unit block. By the time the first residents called '000' to report the fire, heavy smoke was venting from multiple garages, as the fire increased in size and intensity. Apart from a thin layer of widely spaced steel security mesh, no separation existed between the garages. The individual garages were being used to store motor vehicles and an assortment of goods, including furniture (containing polyurethane foam), household goods and trade materials. Hazardous materials, including flammable liquids, LPG cylinders and aerosols were also being stored in the garages. Within a short time of fire breaking out, the polyurethane foam became involved in fire, greatly intensifying fire conditions. Multiple LPG cylinders began to be impacted by severe heat, causing cylinders to vent and at least one boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion occurred.

When firefighters arrived on scene heavy smoke was pouring from beneath the entire length of the roof of the garage, from end to end. The southern end of the garage complex was burning fiercely, fire was travelling rapidly and there were very little external signs that indicated how far the fire had advanced. Firefighters advanced the initial 38 mm attack line along the concourse to the midpoint of the row, where there were indications the fire had not reached that point. A power saw was used to gain access through the garage roller door, enabling firefighters to establish a cutoff point, stopping the fire's advance and begin working back towards the front of the complex. Second arriving crews gained access to the garages where fire was burning fiercely and began directly attacking the fire. A residential unit block containing a number of frail and non-ambulant elderly residents was located just 2.6 metres from the rear wall of the main fire occupancy. Fire intensity caused the rear wall to begin to fail, potentially allowing fire to begin venting towards the exposure. Firefighters established protection of the threatened exposure, while fire attack crews established fire control of fire burning in the garage complex.

This fire consisted of an intensely burning and rapidly moving fire within a structure where no fire separation existed. Fuel loads were volatile, facilitating intense fire conditions. Firefighting operations were conducted in an extremely professional manner, cutting off the spreading fire, establishing fire containment, protecting the heavily threatened exposure, establishing fire control and achieving final extinguishment. The work of firefighters saved half of the garages in the complex and protected a heavily threatened exposure. Firefighters worked with discipline and determination in accordance with excellent fireground command tactics. There are many positive lessons to be shared from operations at this fire.

Incident Type: Garage Complex Fire.

Abbreviations/Acronyms Used in this Report:

BA – Breathing Apparatus.
BLEVE – Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion.
CAFS - Compressed Air Foam System.
CAN - Conditions Actions Needs report.
FireComs – FRNSW Fire Communications.
FIRU – Fire Investigation and Research Unit.
FRNSW – Fire and Rescue NSW.
IC – Incident Commander.
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas.
SCBA – Self Contained Breathing Apparatus.
SO – Station Officer.

Time, Date and Place of Call:

1618 hours on Wednesday 8th May 2024, 91-95 Saddington Street, St Marys.

FRNSW Response:

Hazmat Pumper 77 (St Marys), Aerial Pumper 97 (Huntingwood), Rescue Pumpers 78 (Ropes Crossing) and 102 (Regentville), Pumpers 98 (Cranebrook), 96 (Schofields) and 72 (Merrylands), CAFS Pumper 32 (Mount Druitt), Tanker 78, Heavy Hazmat 77, Duty Commander MW1 (West) and Fire Investigation and Research Unit officer.

Additional Agencies/Services in Attendance:

NSW Police Force, NSW Ambulance and Electricity Authority.

Fireground Description:

The main fire occupancy consisted of a free-standing row of 17 garages, single level, 50 m x 6 m, C channel steel frame (200 mm x 80 mm beam and 140 mm x 60 mm purlin), brick clad and iron sheet roof construction (Colorbond trimline style), secured with steel roller doors. Each garage was 2.9 m x 6 m in size. Separation between individual garages was minimal, consisting of steel wire square mesh with 20 cm spacing. Two 90 mm x 45 mm wall vent openings were located at the base and top of each garage. The concourse at the garage door entrances was deemed the Alpha Side of the fireground (this was the front of the garage complex).

A motor car was located in the garage closest to the street. Remaining garages contained various assorted stored materials, including furniture, household goods and trade materials. Numerous LPG cylinders were located within the garages. The garage complex was not connected to an electricity supply. The garage roller doors could be secured at the lock assembly on the front of the roller door and via a padlocked security bolt attached to concrete at the base of the roller door.

Exposure Alpha consisted of an “L” shaped three level residential unit block, containing 36 units, 30 m x 20 m x 8 m, brick and tile construction, located 6 m to the west of the garage complex.

Exposure Charlie was a residential unit block containing 10 units, two levels, 35 m x 25 m, brick and tile construction, located 2.6 m to the east of the garage complex.

Fireground Installed Firefighting Systems:

The main fire occupancy was not fitted with any installed firefighting systems. Residential units were fitted with working smoke alarms.

Weather at Time of Call:

Temperature 15.9°C (apparent 16.9°C), relative humidity 100%, Winds south southwest at 7 km/h, gusting to 9 km/h, nil rain, cloud 7/8 and mean sea level pressure 1029.2 hPa recorded at Bureau of Meteorology Badgerys Creek automatic weather station (approximately 8.5 km from the fireground). As firefighting operations progressed approximately 2.5 mm of rain fell over the fireground due to passing showers. The sun set at 1705 hours.

Situation Prior to FRNSW Arriving on Scene:

All garages were closed and locked and no activities were taking place within the main fire occupancy prior to the fire being discovered.

Initial Call and Response:

At 1618 hours on Wednesday 8th May 2024, FRNSW Fire Communications received the first of numerous ‘000’ calls reporting a garage fire at 91-95 Saddington Street, St Marys. Hazmat Pumper 77 and CAFS Pumper 32 were initially assigned to the call. As Fire Communications began to receive additional ‘000’ calls reporting smoke and heavy flames issuing from call address, the Fire Communications supervisor increased the response to a Structure Fire 2nd Alarm at 1619 hours, resulting in the additional assignment of Rescue Pumper 78, Pumper 98, CAFS Aerial Pumper 97, Rescue Pumper 102, Heavy Hazmat 77 and Duty Commander MW1 (West).

As appliances responded to the call, firefighters could see a large column of thick black smoke in the direction of the call address. At 1622 hours, Officer-in-Charge Hazmat Pumper 77, S.O. Carlos Henry sent the following informative message whilst en-route:

“FIRECOMS HAZMAT PUMPER 77, BLUE. RESPONDING EN ROUTE HAVE LARGE VOLUMES OF BLACK SMOKE VISIBLE. CONFIRM STRUCTURE FIRE 2ND ALARM, OVER.”

Fire Behaviour Considerations

The following fire behaviour considerations are of note:

1. There were indications the fire started in the third garage from the southern end of the complex. Material initially involved in fire consisted of a polyurethane foam-based mattress and lounge chairs, plastic products and timber materials. Following ignition, superheated gases ascended vertically to the steel roof and travelled beneath the roof in all directions. Air was being drafted into the fire area through ventilation holes at the base of the garages on the Charlie side, increasing fire intensity.
2. Heat, smoke, flames and superheated gases were contained within the garage and unable to vent. These products of combustion travelled laterally to the north and south. Separation between garages was non-existent, allowing unrestricted spread of heat, smoke, flames and superheated gases beneath the steel roof the entire length of the complex, from end to end.
3. Radiant heat from under-roof superheated gases was projected downwards, igniting combustible materials beneath gases. This process resulted in ignition of material within garages 21 metres to the north and 6 metres to the south (southern end of the garage complex). Direct fire spread was also occurring from garage to garage due to a lack of fire separation between the garages.
4. Fire intensity was causing the steel frame that supported the structure to begin sagging. As the frame began to distort, stability of the brick wall began to weaken. Large volumes of heavy superheated black hydrocarbon-laden smoke were venting from the garages. A danger existed that a wall breach on the Charlie side of the garages could result in intense flames impacting the glass windows of Exposure Charlie unit block less than two metres away, placing the unit block in significant danger.
5. Numerous 9 kg LPG cylinders were located within the garages. Heat from the fire caused pressure to increase in a number of cylinders, resulting in operation of the pressure relief valves and venting of flame jets. At least one cylinder was the subject of a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion). The BLEVE occurred when the cylinder pressure relief valve was unable to release vapour pressure that had built up in the cylinder faster than the vapour pressure that was building up, resulting in the cylinder failing and an explosion occurring. A number of smaller explosions caused by aerosols also occurred within the garages.
6. A number of garages contained stored polyurethane foam-based mattresses, lounges and chairs. The involvement of polyurethane foam-based products produced extreme fire behaviour, including rapid progression to flashover, high heat-release rates, high rates of fire spread, intense flames and the production of large volumes of superheated, hydrocarbon-laden, thick, black smoke.

Police had now arrived on scene and reported heavy fire activity and multiple explosions occurring. Several of the garages contained 9 kg LPG cylinders and numerous aerosol cans. A number of BLEVEs (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions) were occurring due to the high levels of heat impacting the gas cylinders and aerosol cans. Most LPG cylinders were venting flame jets, increasing fire intensity.

First Crews Arrive on Scene:

Hazmat Pumper 77, followed closely by Heavy Hazmat 77, was the first appliance to arrive on scene. Upon arrival, S.O. Henry observed black smoke pouring from under the roof line of the garages for the entire length of the complex. A large column of thick, heavy, turbulent, black superheated smoke was venting from garages at the southern end of the complex, extending several hundred metres into the sky. Intense flames were visible within garages at the southern end of the complex. S.O. Henry established command and at 1625 hours sent the following arrival message:







“FIRE COMS HAZMAT PUMPER 77 BLUE. FROM 91 SADDINGTON STREET ST MARYS, WE HAVE A ROW OF GARAGES WELL ALIGHT. COMMENCING FIRE ATTACK, GETTING A LINE OF 38 TO WORK, IN THE OFFENSIVE STRATEGY. S.O. 77 IS I.C. INCIDENT WILL BE KNOWN AS ST MARYS COMMAND. CONFIRM STRUCTURE FIRE 2ND ALARM, OVER.”


Initial Firefighting Operations:

Firefighters commenced to attack the fire with a 38 mm line. S.O. Henry could see flames in the gap between the top of the roller doors and the roof line of the first four garages. Firefighters wearing SCBA with a power saw walked along the front of the garages until they came to a garage where they couldn't see flame (the 12th roller door from the beginning of the structure). They then began to cut the roller door open. After opening this roller door, they could see the fire had progressed this far. Firefighters then cut the 11th door open, where they encountered fire. The fire attack crew began attacking the fire with a 38 mm line. Working with the power saw crew, firefighters progressively commenced to move back toward the start of the complex.

Hazmat Pumper 77 pump operator Firefighter Chris Joseph secured a water supply from a street hydrant and obtained water with two 70 mm collector lines. Firefighter Joseph also established Stage I B.A. Control at the rear of Hazmat Pumper 77.

Rescue Pumper 78, under the command of S.O. Nigel Littleton was the second appliance to arrive on scene. Fire intensity was increasing and flames were beginning to vent from the second and third garages. Rescue Pumper 78 firefighters wearing SCBA began to direct an attack stream through the gap between the top of the roller door and the roof of the garage, using a second 38 mm line. This firefighting stream had a significant impact on the fire, greatly reducing fire intensity within these garages.

-  Fire Area
-  Heat and Smoke
-  LPG Cylinders
-  Radiant Heat Impact
-  Unstable Wall
-  Collapse Exclusion Zone



Fireground Drawing
Not to Scale

Transfer of Command:

Duty Commander MW1 Inspector Kernin Lambert arrived on scene and following a handover briefing, command was transferred to Duty Commander MW1 and S.O. Henry appointed Operations Officer.

Protection of Charlie Exposure:

Charlie Exposure was a two-level residential unit block, located 2.6 metres to the east of the main fire occupancy. Numerous glass windows from the unit block were facing the main fire occupancy and were vulnerable to the intense heat being produced from the fire. Heavy smoke was venting from the rear of the main fire occupancy towards Exposure Charlie. Venting smoke was covering the top of the garage complex Charlie Side wall near the roof line. What firefighters could not see due to venting smoke was severe buckling of the top of the brick wall, due to deformation of the internal structural steel frame, which was being impacted by heavy heat. Fire was now in danger of breaching the upper wall of the garage complex and venting directly towards Exposure Charlie. Police had commenced to evacuate occupants of Exposure Charlie, however a number of these persons were elderly and non-ambulant.

The I.C. tasked third arriving CAFS Aerial Pumper 97, under the command of S.O., Ryan Lawton, to deploy a 38 mm protection line to the Charlie Side of the garage complex and commence protection of the threatened Charlie Exposure. S.O. Lawton was appointed Charlie Commander. A third 38 mm line from Hazmat Pumper 77 was placed in operation, enabling CAP 97 firefighters to direct a protective cooling spray onto Charlie Exposure. A dry precautionary horizontal standpipe and 38 mm attack line were deployed to the mid-point of Charlie Exposure from RP78. At 1631 hours the I.C. sent the following CAN Report:

“FIRE COMS DUTY COMMANDER WEST, ST MARYS COMMAND BLUE. TRANSFER OF COMMAND HAS OCCURED, DUTY COMMANDER WEST IS NOW I.C. AND S.O. 77 IS OPERATIONS OFFICER. WE HAVE A ROW OF APPROXIMATELY 20 GARAGES, ALL JOINED TOGETHER, FREE STANDING, BRICK CONSTRUCTION AND IRON ROOF, APPROXIMATELY 60 METRES X 10 METRES. WE HAVE FIRE THAT HAS STARTED AT THE SOUTHERN END. IT IS SPREADING FROM GARAGE TO GARAGE. WE HAVE APPROXIMATELY 8 GARAGES ALIGHT AT THIS STAGE. WE ARE CURRENTLY GAINING ACCESS USING POWER SAWS, CUTTING INTO THE MID-POINT OF THE GARAGES TO ESTABLISH A CUT-OFF. WE HAVE CREWS IN B.A. WITH LINES OF 38 ATTEMPTING A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE FIRE. WE HAVE EXPOSURES ON THE CHARLIE SIDE, A RESIDENTIAL BLOCK OF UNITS AND WE ARE ESTABLISHING A PROTECTION LINE ON EXPOSURE CHARLIE, OVER.”

Firefighting Operations Continue:

Hazmat Pumper 77 and Heavy Hazmat 77 firefighters were continuing to progress from the mid-point of the garage complex back towards the beginning of the structure, cutting into roller doors and attacking the fire. The power saw crew had also cut into roller doors near the beginning of the structure, allowing Rescue Pumper 78 firefighters to attack fire burning intensely within the first three garages of the structure. This fire attack was achieving very good success and fire activity was significantly diminishing.

As air supplies of initial fire attack crews began to run low, they were replaced with on-deck crews from Rescue Pumper 102 and Tanker 78. CAFS Pumper 32 firefighters placed a third 38 mm attack line in operation to consolidate fire attack. The fire had been contained and fire control was established, however deep-seated fires continued to burn amongst the stacks of materials located within the garages, making final extinguishment a slow and tedious task. All operations continued to be undertaken by SCBA crews. At 1700 hours the I.C. requested the attendance of two additional stations to replace SCBA crews.

Pumper 98, under the command of S.O. Jarrod McGrouther, were tasked to establish after-fire decontamination. Firefighter decontamination was established at the boundary of the SCBA wearing zone.

Firefighters were unable to locate a power supply connected to the garage complex (The main electricity distribution board did not indicate electricity went to the standalone structure, although electricity was connected to above-ground garages beneath the unit block). Electricity Authority operators attended the scene and advised power was not connected to the structure.

Firefighters had been on the scene for approximately one hour when the first signs of daylight beginning to fade were observed. Lighting was established, ensuring that when darkness fell over the fireground, firefighters were working in areas that were correctly lit, eliminating many potential fireground hazards.

Collapse Exclusion Zone Established:

As smoke began to clear, firefighters observed cracks and displacement of bricks on the Charlie Delta corner of the structure. The area was declared a collapse zone and secured with barrier tape. All firefighters working at the fireground were informed of the collapse zone via a general broadcast. Fire Communications were informed of the establishment of the collapse zone.

Final Extinguishment:

To ensure the fire was completely extinguished, firefighters gained entry to all affected garages. All garages were secured by the lock assembly on the front of the roller door and via security bolts attached to concrete at the base of the roller door secured with padlocks. Firefighters used power saws to gain entry to all remaining garages. SCBA crews from 96 and 72 Stations completed final extinguishment of deep-seated pockets of fire that continued to burn within the garages. The fire was declared extinguished by the I.C. at 1817 hours.

Return of Occupants to Unit Blocks:

Approximately 50 persons has been evacuated from Exposures Alpha and Charlie. These exposures had been heavily impacted by thick smoke. Firefighters wearing SCBA carried out atmospheric monitoring of both unit blocks, using Altair 5X multi-head gas detectors. No sign of atmospheric contamination was found. Firefighters informed Police that residents could be returned to their units.

FRNSW Fire Investigation and Research Unit S.O. Ryan Timeus attended the scene to conduct cause and origin determinations. At the conclusion of FRNSW operations, control of the scene was handed over to NSW Police.

Conclusion:

Firefighters were called to a fast-moving fire within a continuous row of garages at Saddington Street, St Marys. The garages contained motor vehicles and assorted combustible and volatile materials including furniture, trade materials, household goods flammable liquids, LPG cylinders and aerosols. Stored furniture was formed from polyurethane foam, further increasing the volatility of stored materials. No separation existed between the garages.

Heavy volumes of smoke were venting from the complex, fire intensity was severe and a number of explosions had occurred before firefighters arrived on scene. Intense fire conditions were causing the garage structure to weaken, potentially allowing fire to breach via the Charlie wall and begin impacting a residential unit block located a short distance away. The unit block's glass windows were facing directly towards the involved row of garages and were vulnerable to fire impact. A number of elderly, frail and non-ambulant persons were located within this unit block.

Firefighters were faced with a number of critical factors, including establishing containment via a fire cut-off point, protection of the threatened exposure and attendant life risk and establishment of fire control. These operations were conducted simultaneously, in a coordinated, systematic and extremely professional manner. Firefighters rapidly established containment of the spreading fire, gained fire control and protected the threatened exposure. Numerous other elements of firefighting operations were conducted in a disciplined and professional manner, including forcible entry, SCBA operations, establishing water supply, after-fire decontamination, salvage and overhaul, fireground communications and fireground command.

Fires involving residential garage structures contain unique complexities, challenges and operational requirements, on account of the nature of the building construction, fuel loads present, fire behaviour and potential exposures under threat. The fire at Saddington Street, St Marys was no exception. FRNSW crews worked with discipline and determination. Fireground command and operational tactics ensured all incident objectives were safely and effectively achieved. All responding crews should be congratulated on their very professional efforts. There are many important lessons to be shared from this fire.



Initial arriving crews place lines in operation at key tactical locations, enabling fire containment, fire control and protection of threatened exposures to be rapidly achieved.



First arriving Hazmat Pumper 77 firefighters place the first attack line in operation. Heavy black smoke vent from the complex. Flame is visible venting from garage number three. Note on the right side of the photograph heavy smoke is beginning to vent towards Exposure Charlie, a residential unit block. As additional crews arrived on scene, firefighters established protection of Exposure Charlie.



The second attack line is placed in operation by Rescue Pumper 78 Firefighters Joshua Codrington and Sue Bayliss. Hazmat Pumper 77 Firefighters have established a cut-off at the mid point of the complex. The photograph on the bottom left shows the colour smoke is beginning, indicating firefighters are having an impact and fire intensity is reducing. Out of view are firefighters establishing protection of Charlie Exposure.




Top: Smoke is almost white, indicating good progress achieving fire control is being made. The power saw crews are moving forwards, from the cut off at the middle of the complex towards the beginning of the complex. Fire attack crews are working just behind the entry teams, extinguishing fire as they move forward. The coordination between the entry and fire attack crews was excellent. This was a great display of teamwork.



The fire has been contained, fire spread has been stopped and fire control has been established. Under the watchful eyes of S.O.s John "Carlos" Henry and Nigel Littleton, firefighters begin final extinguishment of stored materials within the individual garages. The garages contained many hazardous materials and volatile products, including LPG cylinders, stored flammable liquids, aerosols and polyurethane foam-based good; firefighters continue to exercise full precautions.




First arriving Hazmat Pumper 77 became the key focal point of operations. Pump operator Chris Joseph is managing water, pumping operations and water supply to fire attack lines, as well as Main B.A. Control (consisting of two Stage I B.A. Control Boards), radio communications base and staging point for the on-deck crews (RP102 Firefighters Bruce Annabel and Felicity ralphs). Out of site, a rehabilitation area and decontamination area have also been established. This work was just as important as putting water on the fire.




Firefighters Sue Bayliss (top left) and Bruce Annabel (lower left) cut into the garage roller doors, allowing fire attack crews to undertake extinguishment. CAP97 crew firefighters Gavin Hartge and Leon Duke work on the garage containing the involved car. Pictures top right and lower courtesy S.O. Pat Thompson.




Light is fading as heavy rain falls on the fireground on a cold and wet late Autumn afternoon. CAFS Aerial Pumper 97 firefighters Gavin Hartge and Leon Duke continue extinguishment of the car fire. All pictures courtesy S.O. Pat Thompson.



Firefighters continue to complete final extinguishment. Some of the garage openings are widened to improve access. Fire is deep-seated and smouldering. All firefighters continue to wear SCBA.



Top: Firefighter after-fire decontamination is a critical element of all firefighting operations. Pumper 98 was tasked with the duty of establishing firefighter decontamination. All firefighters who left the SCBA wearing zone went through decontamination. Middle and lower: Pumper 96 and 72 firefighters complete the final stages of overhaul.



Helping to improve firefighter welfare: After crews complete tasking operations they pass through the after-fire decontamination, before going to B.A. Control and then to firefighter rehabilitation.




The fire is believed to have started within garage number 3. This garage contained a number of ordinary household furniture items formed from polyurethane foam (indicated by arrows), resulting in intense fire behaviour, including rapid progression to flashover, intense flames and high-heat release rates of 1070 kW to 1110 kW (temperature exceeding 820°C, peak heat flux density (heat rate per unit area) of 760 kW/m² and the production of large volumes of superheated, hydrocarbon-laden, thick, black smoke.



Extreme heat due to the involvement of volatile materials, including polyurethane foam-based furniture, caused structural steel to soften and weaken, becoming displaced. In the above views, the steel **A** beams and **B** purlins supporting the roof initially expanded (pushing outwards) then sagged, causing steel to pull in. Displacement of the steel caused movement of the **C** upper brick walls and **D** brick support columns, creating openings (that could potentially fire to vent) and causing the walls to crack become unstable, presenting a collapse risk.



A number of LPG cylinders of various sizes were located throughout the garages. The cylinder located in the top photographs was located next to a polyurethane foam mattress in garage number 2 and exposed to intense levels of heat, causing an overpressure of the cylinder that caused the cylinder to **A** bulge and ultimately fail when a **B** split in the cylinder casing occurred. The application of water streams by firefighters had an immediate effect on fire conditions, cooling the fire area and reducing cylinder internal pressures. All cylinders showed signs of venting.



The individual garages were divided by steel wire square mesh with 20 cm spacing, allowing unrestricted fire spread. The roof was formed by steel sheets (indicated by arrow). Superheated fire gases spread beneath the roof from end to end through the complex. Radiant heat from the overhead fire gases ignited the surfaces of stored materials, facilitating rapid fire involvement remote from the garage of origin. The gases travelling beneath the roof were hydrocarbon laden, burning at temperatures that exceeded 800°C. Firefighters did an excellent job establishing an effective fire cut-off point.



Garage contents consisted of a large variety of stored materials, representing a “witches brew” fuel load. Although some garages were lightly loaded, others were filled to capacity. Many contained hazardous materials including flammable liquids, LPG cylinders and aerosols.